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Introduction 
 
'Community planning' (as an instrumental action, pursuing a public good) may initially appear 
inappropriate to the French situation with regards to urban planning.  Although associations 
founded on a platform of voluntary action - like the Fondation de l’Abbé Pierre or militant groups 
like the DAL (Droit au Logement – the right to housing) and the action of collective movements 
meeting irregularly on a regional or city-wide basis - are accepted and sanctioned by the State, 
these associations are often regarded, both by those who initiated them and by those who have 
been confronted by them, less as vehicles for self-help and more as expressions of opposition to 
authorities which are seen as abusing their powers or failing to address the concerns and needs 
of minority or dominated groups.  They are viewed as militant, often mobilising in the face of 
perceived threats from urban development or the practice of urban planning.  It is from this 
viewpoint of general consideration that we shall examine the relationship between basic urbanist 
actions and the authorities in power, in France and in the region of Marseille, and several specific 
cases.  Our concern in this chapter is with the challenging context for ‘community’ action, and 
the struggle to secure basic rights and representation, in some of Europe’s poorest and most 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
 
Let us assimilate those entering the country 
(to the tune of 'Allons Enfants de la Patrie...', La Marseillaise, Rouget de L’Isle, 1792) 
 
The republ i can concept ion o f  French soc ie ty  
 
In the French understanding of society, the notion of 'community' generally refers to a group 
distinguished by ethnic or religious origin, and which may possibly be part of a well-defined 
region.  Alternatively, the idea of community may simply be associated with the 'commune' (the 
lowest level of territorial governance), in which case there is no allusion to religious, ideological 
or ethnic basis.  The community merely comprises the residents, French citizens, of a particular 
place.  So conceptions of community divide into two types: the first looks for particular traits 
that bind people together; the second is 'socio-spatial' but does not assume any particular bonds 
between individuals; they are merely co-located.  The community discourse in France has been 
dominated not by the positive interactions between community actors (which has been the focus 
throughout much of this book), but by a fear of the introverted nature of some communities and 
by the social tensions that arise from a lack of cultural integration. 
 
Thus the term 'community' is viewed differently in France than in many Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Its meaning is ambiguous and even suspect, being associated with a pejorative form of 
'communitarianism' which threatens national unity.  The existence of minorities - sometimes 
with their secessional ambitions (e.g. Corsicans, Bretons or Basques) or displaying a tendency to 
retreat into ghettos (e.g. those from the former North African colonies) - fuels irrational fears 
amongst Republicans, leading both national government and local authorities to deny these 
regions and groups the means to do more for themselves, for fear that it will accelerate social 
disintegration.  This is clearly a very different context for community action: one in which that 
action, if undertaken in areas of severe social need or political ambition, is viewed with suspicion 
and a force for undermining the state.  There is a tradition of interventionism in France, 
exercised by and in support of a strong state, and this colours attitudes towards the idea of 
community and perceptions of what rights and responsibilities should, or should not, be 
assigned. 
 
Assimilat ion as a model ,  and soc ia l  mix as an approach in the f i e ld o f  housing 
 
Assimilation has been a key goal of the French immigration model.  After World War II, 
immigrants arriving in the country to assist with reconstruction (especially from the former 
colonies) and who helped achieve the 'Trente Glorieuses' - the thirty years of economic growth 
after the war - were repatriated once their periods of employment had ended.  This approach was 
slowly phased out and immigrants exercised their right to stay in France.  The state then set 
about housing immigrants and their families in the large public estates of the 1960s, moving to a 
policy of integration (Kepel, 2012) which aimed to achieve social mixing.  The goal of this 
strategy was to realise the republican vision of social assimilation, and it initially yielded some 
positive results with French and immigrant families integrating well.  Evaluations at the time 
pointed to the many benefits achieved: upward social mobility through a sharing of contacts; 
effective integration of children within the school system; and clear socio-economic advantage 
for the longest-standing immigrant families, who enjoyed many social benefits over the previous 
generation. 
 
The strategy was particularly effective for the first waves of immigrants from the Maghreb 
immediately after the war.  But it seemed to work less well for immigrants from more distant 
cultures (those from Vietnam, China or 'black' Africa).  The growing economic crisis of the 
1970s, combined with departure of the now more affluent immigrant (and non-immigrant) 
families from the great housing estates during the same period, triggered the socio-economic 
decline of these places.  They became 'sink' estates from which the previous social mix of 
residents disappeared, to be replaced by an ethnic mix whose common denominator was 
extreme poverty. 
 
From suppress ing local  co-operat ion. . .  
 
Co-operative action has ancient origins in France, but its development in the twentieth century 
was hampered by the strong intervention, noted above, that has orientated the structuring of 
French society.  There has been a concern to steer social development in a particular direction: 
policy-makers have not celebrated difference, and nor have they promoted different approaches 
to development in different places.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, public bureaus 
were established, under the Bonnevay Law 1912, to fund public housing.  As in other parts of 
Europe, the rate of public housing production accelerated in the 1950s as part of wider 
reconstruction efforts and in response to economic growth.  That growth followed on from a 
period of acute shortage of housing just after the war, which was highlighted by Abbé Pierre 
(founder of the Emmaus movement, which helped homeless people and refugees) and which the 
state responded to with an authoritarian policy of property requisition and industrial 
construction, based predominantly on the model set out by the Modern Movement.  An 
enormous 'public housing enterprise' (Raymond, 1984) was set in motion which was mainly 
concerned with building and management, relegating social programmes behind this primary 
mission.  Other initiatives were suppressed, including the self-build schemes being promoted at 
the time by trade unionists (Pinson, 2012). 
 
. . . to  res ident mobi l i sat ion 
 
Requisition became a catalyst, however, for unrest.  After 1968, many inner-city neighbourhoods 
became stages for popular struggles against evictions, and these struggles gave residents the 
opportunity to unite and collectively organise the defence of their homes.  The immediate impact 
was often non-eviction; but the longer-lasting legacy was a changed vision of the city and new 
forms of social organisation within these neighbourhoods.  The struggles also prompted a 
reappraisal of public housing policy and a softening of what had previously been a very 
centralised approach to housing delivery and management.  Suddenly, there were calls to focus 
on the 'social development of neighbourhoods' (Blancherie et al, 1972) and the subsequent 
'Public Housing White Book' of 1975 asserted for the first time that the mobilisation of residents 
and their active participation in neighbourhood affairs should be a key goal of future public 
policy.  It added that the mere maintenance or physical renovation of housing could no longer be 
the sole occupation of that policy, but that it should extend its reach into the social, economic, 
cultural and educational life of neighbourhoods.  Very soon, a raft of initiatives were launched 
that aimed to address these concerns. 
 
During the years that followed, however, the attention given to 'problem neighbourhoods' 
tended to have a stigmatising effect.  For that reason, the focus switched - by 1990 - to whole 
town policies which avoided targeting particular areas.  These tried to create a level playing field 
of social and economic opportunity without advertising any 'priority geography' or setting any 
particular 'urban boundaries' for intervention.  This meant that much of the targeted funding for 
social programmes, created after 1975, started to dry up and the organisations that had formed in 
the early 1970s began to look for direct funding from the state.  This was subject to strict 
conditions and proved difficult to access.  It did little, therefore, to promote social development. 
 
This brief narrative says much about the French resistance to supporting community 
development and initiative and the preference for strictly controlled interventions.  Early 
promotion, forty years ago, of social development at a neighbourhood level was quickly reined 
back and straitjacketed by funding restrictions, which had the aim of restricting activities 
according to particular central policy objectives.  Neighbourhood organisations found 
themselves corralled into specific areas of activity, seeking support from the ANRU (Agence 
Nationale de la Rénovation urbaine - National Agency for Urban Renovation) for physical 
regeneration, or the ACSE (Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances – National 
Agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities).  Neighbourhood activities became tightly 
'administered' from Paris.  Local groups needed the support, but it came with many strings 
attached, as government sought to steer the types of projects and activities of those organisations 
emerging from the protests of the late 1960s. 
 
Challenging representat ive  democracy 
 
However, the crisis in representative democracy - felt throughout Europe and beyond - has given 
further impetus to local activism.  Since the 1980s, the rate of abstention in most local, regional 
and national elections has been increasing.  In response, new opportunities have been created for 
citizens to express their views on changes or developments affecting their environment or daily 
lives.  A series of laws - beginning with the Bouchardeau Law 1983 (requiring that all projects 
likely to impact on the environment be subject to public inquiry: European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport, 2003: 83) and then moving through the Solidarity and Urban Renewal 
(SRU) Law 2000 and Local Democracy Law 2002 - have gradually strengthened the requirement 
to consult and involve residents in transport and development decisions.  The 2002 Law, for 
example, created Comités de Quartier (neighbourhood committees) in cities with more than 80,000 
inhabitants.  This followed on from the creation of a National Commission for Public Debate 
(CNDP) in 1997, with responsibility for facilitating engagement around large-scale 
developments. 
 
These legislative changes have given rise to an important debate within the political and research 
communities.  This has focused on the motives behind the move to a more open democracy in 
which there seem to be greater opportunities for input and discourse.  Is the aim to genuinely 
compensate for the limits and failings of representative democracy, delivering real 
empowerment, or is the actual goal simply to diffuse local conflict, with minimum impact on 
top-down interventions, and in order to protect government from the accusation that its 
mandate is increasingly fragile? 
 
A number of research networks in France are now focused on this critical question, including the 
'Democracy and Participation' (GIS) group, formed in 2010.  More broadly, the 'Collectif Pouvoir 
d'agir' - comprising individuals, local associations and national research groups concerned with 
the political responses to social exclusion - was created in the same year.  Pouvoir d'agir or the 
'power to act' is taken to have the same meaning as the English term 'empowerment'.  The 
collective published a key report in 2013, advocating a 'democracy of involvement' (Bacqué & 
Mechmache, 2013) though it is too early to say whether such mobilisation will any effect on 
urban policy. 
 
So far in this chapter, we have drawn a picture of neighbourhood action in France growing from 
the urban protests of the 1960s, but in a broader context of official resistance and an overarching 
philosophy of centrism and interventionism: ideas that support the republic conception of 
statehood and national unity.  However, the crisis of democracy and the risk of a weakened 
electoral mandate for central intervention has provided an added impetus for more open 
democracy in France over the last 20 or so years.  In the remainder of this chapter, we examine 
how participation and the pouvoir d'agir is able to express itself in the region of Marseille and in 
particular in the working-class areas to the north of the city. 
 
The City of Marseille 
 
Marseille has always been considered a 'special case' amongst French cities.  It is a city of 
pronounced segregation, with the historic line of the Canebière running from the Vieux Port 
separating the very poor north from the wealthy south.  In recent years, this line has become 
perforated as the middle classes flee the city, bringing a penetration of poorer households into 
the south.  Marseille is now the most impoverished large city (with a population of more than a 
million inhabitants) in France.  A third of the population live beneath the poverty line and within 
the working class areas, more than half of all young people are unemployed.  At the time of 
writing, a long and slow journey towards socio-economic recovery (assisted by the 
Euromediterranée project focused on the rejuvenation of the city's port area) which seemed to be 
given momentum by Marseille's designation as European Capital of Culture in 2013, appears to 
have been brought to an abrupt end by a fresh outbreak of violence and gangland killings linked 
to drug trafficking.  An almost apocalyptic picture has been painted of the city, within the media 
and by a number of politicians.  In that climate, it is difficult to detach oneself from the everyday 
drama and to think critically about what has been achieved through experimental participative 
urbanism in Marseille's working-class neighbourhoods.  In the sections that follow, we examine 
the story of the 'MOS', later 'MOUS', a housing renewal intervention with the attendant aim of 
promoting and co-ordinating social development and community organizing, firstly in Marseille 
and then in other French inner-cities. 
 
The Pet i t  Seminaire  exper iment and the repowering neighbourhoods 
 
The MOS (which later became MOUS) was born in Marseille; it grew out of the work of the 
Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Formation Institutionnelle du Sud-Est (CERFISE), a research unit 
founded in 1975 by the sociologist Michel Anselme.  The unit's focus was on bringing about a 
transformation of social housing areas in the city.  Anselme was influenced by Michel Foucault's 
work on the 'equipment of power', and the struggles that individuals engage in against 
exploitation, undertaken during the 1970s (later published in 'The Subject and Power', Foucault, 
1983).  CERFISE and Anselme worked, in the early to mid-1980s, on the 'Petit Seminaire', an area 
of social housing built in 1959 which had become blighted by a range of problems.  In that 
project, focus was put on understanding the lives and the values of inhabitants.  Anselme began 
by inventing a fictional city in which people could express opinion freely without fear of ridicule 
or repression.  He offered that vision to the bureaucrats in charge of Marseille's public housing, 
challenging their view that residents' articulate only confused and contradictory opinions and 
therefore that the role of bureaucrats, as public landlord, should be to replace lay 'irrationality' 
with an informed and expert vision of a 'good neighbourhood'.   CERFISE eventually acted as 
an intermediary between the landlord and the tenants.  It tried to convince these groups that 
residents are not always irrational, and intervention is not always negative, eventually proposing 
to create a 'public space' (or 'public sphere' in the sense used by Habermas to describe an area 
that promotes social life, where individuals can congregate to work through their problems) 
which would be a place of ritual and drama and with great 'power attached to it' (Anselme, 2000).  
The aim was to establish the interactional infrastructure of the city, which was hitherto lacking, 
and which could be used to draw out shared values and, in the long term, assist in 'community 
development'. 
 
The spec i f i c i t i es  o f  the Marse i l l e  soc ia l  wor ld  
 
However, social unity (and therefore the potential for community development, as understood 
elsewhere in the world) is perhaps more difficult to achieve in Marseille than in many other 
cities.  Anselme believed that family networks, underpinning criminality, had become an '[...] 
inescapable reality for those wishing to understand [...] the dynamics and specific management 
problems facing authorities', adding that Marseille was witnessing a 'reappearance or 
perpetuation of a type of Mediterranean sociability' (ibid.), based around the family and fuelled 
by poverty.  The more recent consequences of this have been the creation of a volatile and 
violent 'gangland' in which families compete for monopoly control of various criminal activities.  
There is great solidarity within the gangs, which could be said to possess an abundance of 'social 
capital', but not always wielded with positive ends in sight (see Rydin, this volume). 
 
It is not only the criminality which poses a significant challenge in Marseille, but also the reality 
of spatially diffuse family and ethnic networks being stronger than local bonds.  This means that 
the sense of belonging, locally, to a place is weaker in these poorer neighbourhoods: the reality is 
of a city comprising a complex mosaic of affinity with sometimes dozens of different ethnic 
groups living in close proximity but displaying limited sociability with one another.  This 
weakens any sense if a ‘socio-spatial community’, making it difficult to achieve the dialectic goals 
of an open democracy or Anselme’s fiction of the ideal city. 
 
Obstac les  to  democracy in Marse i l l e :  the economy of  drugs and corrupt ion 
 
Marseille is a city of multiple unofficial economies, from the makeshift economy of repair 
services (Tarrius, 2002) to the international trade of people trafficking.  These activities can be 
highly profitable for their participants (Péraldi, 1999) but, alongside the drug economy, they have 
a hugely detrimental effect on the urban society (Duport, 2012).  These activities come to 
dominate economic life and come to be seen as ‘normal’ by many young people.  Rather than 
having school, apprenticeships and career aspirations as their reference points, those growing up 
in these areas can quickly become drawn into the unofficial economies and this acts as a brake 
on open dialogue as people become locked into crime and increasing fearful, as a result, of 
engagement with authorities.  There seems to be little point, in this context, of investing in the 
interactional infrastructure called for by Michel Anselme.  The interactions that do occur have 
not always been positive: the structures of local power have occasionally been drawn into some 
of the criminal activity that festers in Marseille’s working-class neighbourhoods.  The president 
of the Conseil General des Bouches du Rhône was found to have given out a procurement contract for 
waste treatment in return for bribes; members of a specialist unit of the national police (the BAC 
Nord), since disbanded, was found to be guilty of protecting some drug gangs in return for a 
percentage of the profit from trafficking.  Such episodes do little to build trust between the 
neighbourhoods and the local state and creating an obviously challenging environment for 
positive community development. 
 
Self-development in the Marseille region 
 
However, despite this sombre picture there have been a number of localised community 
development initiatives.  Some of these started with very modest ambitions but have been 
assisted by national agencies.  The ‘Compagnons Bâtisseurs’ (or ‘building companions’) came 
together to assist new immigrants (principally Comorians) develop the skills needed to improve 
the very poor and neglected private accommodation they found themselves in when arriving in 
France.  They provided not only the technical skills for undertaking immediate repairs, but also 
skills that might be of use in the labour market.  In some instances the building companions have 
been called upon to assist middle class households, residing elsewhere in the city or even further 
afield, in group build projects.  In recent years, small complexes of typically 10 to 12 apartments, 
built by their occupants, have sprung up all over France. 
 
But back in Marseille, there have also been more broadly focused ‘self-help’ initiatives aimed at 
improving the social, economic and physical circumstances that immigrants find themselves in.  
The success of these initiatives has been circumscribed by a number of factors, as we shall see in 
the two examples that are now presented. 
 
Part i c ipat ion and choice  in two Marse i l l e  es tates  (Bel l evue 3 eand Bassens 15e)  
 
{Insert Map 1 here} 
 
The illustrative cases used in this section draw from research into participative processes in the 
Bellevue and Bassens areas of the city (Messaoudène, 2010; 2012).  Both look at the way in 
which the pouvoir d'agir is expressed, its outcomes and the limits to this form or power and action.  
The cases also say something about the degree of acceptance of difference and different needs 
within French society and by the state. 
 
Bellevue is in the third arrondissement of Marseille, in the Saint-Mauront district.  The example of 
participation concerns engagement around a top-down intervention leading to the demolition 
and rebuilding of part of the existing public housing in very rundown area with what is a diverse 
population, but dominated by settled North African immigrants who have been joined by an 
influx of Comorians since the 1990s.  Bassens is in the fifteenth arrondissement close to the 
Arnavaux industrial estate.  The example here is of a small housing estate with a ‘transitory’ 
population.  It was built in the 1960s and has since become home to an Algerian population with 
very dense social networks that have impacted strongly on the form and outcome of residents’ 
initiatives.  Like the Bellevue case, this example also involved mobilization and participation 
around housing renewal. 
 
The Bel l evue and Bassens Intervent ions 
 
Bellevue in the late 1990s was subject to the ‘Plan de Sauvegarde’ (1999-2004) which aimed to 
reduce housing density in the area by removing 132 apartments from a total of 814, and 
thereafter renovating and improving the remaining stock.  This was a top-down intervention, but 
one that sought to engage with an existing residents’ association – the ‘Amicale des Locataires’ (the 
Tenants’ Friendly Society) – which, however, was largely inactive and seemed to represent very 
few of the area’s residents.  From the point of view of the local authorities, the objective in 
Bellevue was to generate trust in the process, by spreading information about the project and by 
being receptive to local concerns.  It was generally felt that dialogue between residents and the 
institutional stakeholders would quicken the pace of development and reduce friction and 
potential conflict.  To that end, a total of 54 meetings took place.  Yet attendance at those 
meetings was not always high and it proved difficult to connect to some groups: the established 
North African community was easier to mobilize, but the newer Comorian migrants tended to 
distance themselves from the orchestrated participation.  A particular issue in Bellevue was the 
‘cultural distance’ (and trust) between more settled immigrants and the public authorities and 
between the newer arrivals and those same authorities. 
 
{Insert Image 1 Here: Bellevue (Messaoudène, 2005)} 
 
In Bassens, participation was again prompted by proposed housing renewal in the form of a 
MOUS intervention.  Originally built in 1964 to replace what had been a ‘shanty town’, it was 
decided in 1991 that the complex of apartments on the site should be demolished and that 
residents should be decanted to homes outside of Bassens.  The 1964 development had 
comprised 110 apartments each of less than 40 m².  This number was reduced to 56 by an earlier 
intervention in 1975.  In some ways, the story of Bassens is more complex than that of Bellevue.  
Some of the Algerian residents, incensed by the plan to demolish their homes, refused to move, 
which prompted prolonged engagement and more spontaneous forms of local action.  It also led 
to a further project by the Marseille-Habitat public housing body between 1998 and 2004 aimed 
at allowing the remaining 31 families on the site to be rehoused in situ, in 40 apartments (built in 
two phases) in a low-rise ‘maisonette’ style. 
 
{Insert Image 2 Here: Bassens (Messaoudène, 2005)} 
 
Processes  
 
In this section we wish to focus briefly on the experience of participation in the two study areas, 
drawing on observations from meetings between representatives of the local authorities and 
resident groups.  It is sometimes said that participation is an opportunity for those who have 
already taken key decisions to merely persuade ‘community actors’ of the wisdom of those 
decisions: to convince them at an early stage that the right decision (i.e. to ‘educate’) and 
therefore avoid later conflict.  Meetings in both areas were sometimes confrontational.  In one 
instance, a resident objected to the replacement of communal windows in the apartment blocks 
(in Bellevue) with metal bars.  Irritated by the criticism, the local authority representative said 
that the replacement had become necessary as many residents elected to throw rubbish out of 
the communal windows, often breaking them, and displayed absolutely no respect for their 
homes or the communal spaces.  There was no focus on working with residents to change 
behaviour (perhaps by installing new means of disposing of rubbish quickly from upper floors), 
but rather the imposition of what appeared to be punitive (and cheap) measures that might well 
have resulted in rubbish piling up in corridors. 
 
It was clear in the meetings that residents were concerned about their living environment.  Many 
wished to see the installation of automatic watering systems for flower beds and green areas, 
rather than infrequent manual watering.  This was dismissed as too expensive and ‘technically 
difficult’.  The Bellevue residents appeared to have little capacity to understand costs and lacked 
the knowledge needed to rebut what were clearly flawed technical arguments from the local 
authority.  The clear intention was to drive the project through, making only minor tactical 
concessions to the residents.  The only ‘victory’ won by the Amicale des Locataires was the naming 
of a new access road to the site. 
 
The entire engagement at Bellevue appeared tokenistic: the local authority provided basic 
information on the operations underway, and displayed little concern for promoting genuine 
involvement.  But the core problems lay with the residents themselves.  Their pouvoir d'agir was 
critically constrained by their own internal divisions.  The North Africans were tentatively 
engaged with the Amicale des Locataires but the Comorians were entirely absent from this 
organization.  This might simply be explained by the short period of time they had spent in the 
area, relative to their North African neighbours.  But detailed research with Comorians in 
Marseille (Direche-Slimani & Le Houerou, 2002) has shown that patterns of sociability are 
shaped by ‘dense, complex associative organisation’ sometimes expressed in extremely closed 
social and cultural events.  In other words, these recent immigrants keep themselves to 
themselves and may be suspicious of broader social engagement, not being familiar with its rules 
and rituals.  They expend their energy, instead, on internalised activity and a ‘veil of invisibility’ 
has therefore hung over Marseille’s Comorian ‘community’ for a number of years.  For reasons 
of protection, it is closely knit and difficult to penetrate.  In Bellevue, the particular division 
between the North Africans and the Comorians may appear odd as both groups are Muslim, but 
they participate in different Islamic practices and are not therefore joined in common worship. 
 
The Bassens area displayed no such divisions, and the Algerian population was accustomed to 
fighting for its rights.  Since the Beurs’ March for equality and against racism in October 1983 
(‘Beur’ being French slang for people with North African roots) the attitudes of many North 
Africans against the ‘host’ population had changed.  A belief developed that protest offered a 
real means of changing attitudes and outcomes, and from the 1980s onwards, immigrants from 
this part of the world became much faster to mobilise and to voice opposition to unwanted 
interference, or claim particular rights.  The right to better housing had become a regular battle 
cry, which was quickly heard in Bassens.  From the very first meeting organised by the newly-
formed residents’ committee in Servières, it was clear that there would be conflict.  The local 
authority’s aim was to demolish Bassens and relocate its residents away from the nearby 
industrial estate.  In the face of stiff opposition – galvanised behind a local man who emerged to 
lead the committee and mobilise the area’s residents – the authority offered a range of incentives, 
none of which were accepted by the Algerian community. 
 
The contrast with Bellevue could not have been more striking.  Faced with an articulate, well-
organised community (which knew its rights and had a single, clear, goal), the local authority was 
quickly forced onto the back-foot.  And by the time the authority came round to the view that it 
needed to work with the community towards a compromise, the latter’s goals had been much 
refined.  It no long wished merely to stay put, but had a very specific set of requirements.  The 
local authority returned to Bassens in 1998; this time with a proposal to replace the existing 
apartments with new homes, but move residents away from the industrial estate and bring them 
closer to an adjacent railway line.  The tenants’ committee was unconvinced by the plan and 
therefore asked the City of Marseille to intervene and require further physical protection from 
the railway.  Once this was agreed, the works commenced according to a plan that had been 
approved by the local community. 
 
What became clear during these second phase negotiations was that the community was 
technically adept at interpreting plans, weighing up their implications, and responding with clear 
counter-arguments and requiring specific alterations.  There was a capacity in the tenants’ 
association to communicate beyond the area (on the part of the leader of the committee) and to 
understand the technical arguments and realities presented by the authority.  In Bellevue, these 
resources were entirely absent.  In Bassens, they were in ample supply, with the community 
endowed with a great deal of social capital.  One good example of this is what happened after 
the authority had completed the first phase of the project on-site.  Many of the residents of 
Bassens worked in the building trade and were familiar with ‘plans of works’ and building quality 
standards.  After the first homes were built, they were inspected by these residents, who drew 
attention to poor workmanship, problems with sound insulation and instances of kitchen layouts 
not adhering to the original plans. 
 
Once again the residents mobilized, using a cultural festival organised by a young artist from the 
neighbourhood as a platform for their concerns.  Following a lengthy protest, during which the 
community was unable to persuade the local authority to respond to the problems, the two 
parties took their grievance to court.  A subsequent ruling in favour of the residents led to the 
appointment of an independent inspector of works.  The inspector instructed the authority to 
rectify a number of problems with the completed homes.  These works commenced in April 
2000 and the residents were finally rehoused in 2004. 
 
Outcomes 
 
In contrast to Bellevue, there was no pre-existing tenants’ group in Bassens.  Rather, a tenants’ 
committee was established in response to the MOUS intervention.  Its president, a charismatic 
personality in whom the residents had great faith, was to play a determining role in the way in 
which the project was carried out and in realising the final outcomes for tenants.  He proved to 
be a pragmatist and networker, someone able to communicate effectively with public officials.  
He was very much the ‘everyday fixer’ described by Van der Pennen and Schreuders (this 
volume) and the ‘boundary-crosser’ described by Kilpatrick and colleagues (this volume).  With 
his leadership, there was a proactive mobilisation of residents through a number of associations 
and staged events.  The public authorities were confronted by a vocal group, able to articulate 
their concerns on their own terms.  They could not be merely ‘persuaded’ of the logic of the 
intervention and the planned decant through staged participation, as the public authority had 
wished; rather then sought a compromise with their landlord and what they saw as a better 
overall deal for the ‘community’.  Indeed, the manner of their mobilisation (home-grown rather 
than externally engineered) gave the tenants’ committee a strong hand in negotiations; and 
because of their evident competency and knowledge in all matters technical (Deboulet, 2013), 
they were eventually able to confront the landlord in court and win a compromise involving the 
demolishing of their existing homes and the building of the Marseille-Habitat apartments. 
 
Although not perhaps an entirely positive experience for the local authority, the Bassens case 
says a great deal about the latent potential, in Marseille, for sudden eruptions of highly effective 
‘community action’, in spite of all the contextual challenges noted above.  The ingredients were 
all there: a small neighbourhood with close social bonds based on common ethnicity; a 
charismatic leader with the skills needed to bring people together; and an external threat to 
individual wellbeing, that became ‘up-scaled’ through the mobilisation into a clear ‘community’ 
issue.  None of these ingredients were present in Bellevue.  No leader emerged; the community 
was heavily divided along ethnic lines, and its mobilisation was forced, with poorly-attended 
meetings becoming merely an opportunity for the local authority to tell residents what was about 
to happen to them.  Hence, the more numerous but less mobilised residents of Bellevue were 
not able to shape the outcome of the intervention in any way.  Indeed, they were subject to a 
very obvious form of authoritarianism, hidden behind a façade of good intention and made 
possible by the incapacity of the community to come together across behind any defined goals. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have examined the manifestation of ‘community planning’ (a term that is not 
widely recognized or used in France) in a very specific context: one of large-scale immigration, 
poverty, and social and ethnic segregation.  Besides the struggles documented in this chapter, 
other forms of community action exist in France.  These include the collective group build 
projects dotted around the country, fuelled by the appetite of middle-class households to take 
more direct control over their housing situations and, where possible, to lighten their ecological 
footprint by promoting greener forms of development.  The origin of these projects can be 
traced back to the self-build promoted by trade unionists in the 1950s, which crumpled under 
the weight of the modernist housing project, but which is now emerging in a new, privatized 
form. 
 
In the working class neighbourhoods of Marseille, some examples of community action have 
emerged from the recent renewal and reconsideration of the large social housing projects of the 
1960s.  From the 1980s onwards, lip-service was paid to the ‘développement social des quartiers’ (DSQ 
– social development of neighbourhoods).  This later transformed into a broader ‘politique de la 
ville’ and a wider concern for urban governance, centred on large-scale programmes and projects 
and given added impetus by early signs of a crisis of electoral involvement during those years.  
However, major housing interventions continue to be dominated by large public bureaucracies 
whose primary focus is physical renewal.  They concentrate their efforts on persuading the 
residents of target neighbourhoods of the logic of their interventions and rarely encounter 
significant resistance.  This is because ‘communities’ tend to be diffuse, divided and often 
disconnected from the immediate neighbourhood.  They have other priorities, are blighted by 
crime, or lack trust in public authority.  Residents often struggle to find common focus.  Where 
they do, such as in Bassens, the conditions for effective community action are just right – the 
neighbourhoods are relatively closed, they share an ethnicity, and they possess the skills, 
knowledge and leadership needed to confront what might be described as bureaucratic 
indifference.  But these conditions are rare.  The Bellevue example is more typical of the 
interactions between ‘community’ and the ‘state’ in Marseille and in France more generally. 
 
The interventionist tradition, originating in the Welfare State, is a powerful force in French 
politics.  It finds expression in many areas of public policy and also in urban planning.  Power is 
not easily relinquished and even when confronted by what appear to be quite reasonable 
community concerns (as in the example of Bassens), the state will choose to fight rather than 
bow to local action.  And even in instances where it is funding (from Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations or CDC) local initiatives, associations or foundations, it is clear that it is doing so in 
order to exert influence rather than to ‘empower’.  It is possible that - in the years ahead - a 
greater proportion of funding for voluntary initiative will start to come from non-state sources 
(as seems increasingly likely given the level of government debt).  This might provide the 
impetus for a transition away from ‘participative’ forms of urban planning aimed at legitimizing 
state action to more ‘communitarian’ forms of planning with communities in control.  But such a 
transition would be dependent on a willingness of the state to accept and support different 
‘communities’, whilst those communities would need to develop the capacities needed to lead 
and deliver projects.  The situation in France serves as a reminder, if one is needed, of the very 
different and sometimes difficult contexts in which community action gestates.  Many of the 
chapters in this book deal with the aspirations and consequent mobilization of middle class 
communities, which face few, if any, of the challenges encountered in Marseille’s working-class 
neighbourhoods.  Here, the capacity to act is a rare commodity, but one that sometimes shines 
through adversity to bring vital gains for some of France’s most disadvantaged citizens.  
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